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MOTIVATED DOGMATISM AND
THE HIGH-ABILITY STUDENT
Jennifer Riedl Cross and Tracy L. Cross
THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY

I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail.
Maslow (1966, p. 15)

The dogmatic individual is, in many ways, a loss to humanity. Our unique ability to develop hypotheses about the world we live in and, then, to test their
veracity has brought us to this astounding information age. Thinking about
our problems with an ever-widening perspective, from individual to societal to
global, has allowed us to improve the life conditions of nearly everyone on the
planet, albeit some more than others. There is more information available to the
average individual today than ever before in the history of humankind. When
an individual chooses to ignore relevant available information to maintain a position, the unique ability we humans share-to think about a problem-is wasted .
From a psychological perspective, the decision to ignore information is not
arbitrary. A person placing a priority onmaintaining a position over considering
relevant information does so for a reason. Perhaps the information, although
available, is imperceptible to the individual. The message stated loud and clear
to a person with impaired hearing simply will not be heard. The message stated
clearly at a graduate-student vocabulary level may well be unintelligible to a
child. Relevant information i lost. B ut the hearing impaired or the child in
these examples is not considered dogmatic. The dogmatic individual can hear
or understand the message, but chooses not to listen to or process it. Dogmatism is a behavior, and a behavior that is not reflexive is motiva ted. These
motivations deserve scrutiny. Although one might imagine high intellectual
ability to provide superior belief system.s, there is no evidence for such a <level-
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opmental anomaly. There i in fact, evidence to the contrary (e.g., Klaczynski,
1997; Klaczynski, Gordon, & Fauth, 1997; Stanovich & West, 1997) that will
be discussed here.
Highly able individuals develop in a complex world made up of widely dis
parate influences and experience (Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Colem.an & Cross,
2005). As they n1.ature, they are exposed to parents who may or may not be
caring and responsive to their needs (Baumrind, 1971). They may grow up
in dangerou environments or with chooling inadequate not only for their
giftednes , but to meet any child' need . Erik on (1968) describe the crises
that face all individual as they develop and gifted children experience all of
these crises. The combination and permutations of all factors po sible to affect
the lives of the developing child are eemingly infinite. As they create their
worldviews and belief systern s, whatever factors have been influential will have
different con equences.
Considering the lack of a common definition of giftedne , individuals who
bear the label will have a wide variety of exceptional abilities, but all fall under
the umbrella definition of "hum.an ' and all are subject to the need identified
by Abraham Maslow (1970) for drive satisfaction. Only when the phy iological
need of hunger and thirst are satisfied can a person begin to concern herself
with afety needs " ecurity; structure, order, law and limit ; trength in the
protector; and so on" (p. 18). Meeting the e afety needs is a precondition
for pursuing sati faction of the need for belongingne and love, and then of
e teem. (of elf and from others). Integral to attaining the ba ic needs at all lev
el i another hierarchy of ne ed , which Maslow describe as interrc lated and
ynergistic with the firs t. These are the cognitive needs, in which the "desire to
know is prepotent over the desire to under tand ' (p. 50). A dogmatis t may have
atisfied her or his desire to know and under tand long before a per on with a
more open mind. Any discussion of dogmatism m.u t consider the motivation
behind an individual' choice to inadequately process available information,
particularly when that individual poss ess es exceptional intellectual ability.
Psychological research over the pa t several decades provides us with a num
ber of pers pectives on the phenomenon of dogmati m, the tendency of an indi
vidual to ignore evidence while holding firm.ly to a belief that may or may
not be warranted. Dogmatism is a failure to engage in thinking, a premature
"settling" on a belief. In thi chapter, we discus several associated avenues of
research that apply to an inability or motivation leading to such a failure. The
discussion i followed by suggestions for developing open minds among high
ability s tudents.

What Dogmatism Is and Is Not
As we delve into an analy is of dogmati m., it i important to m.aintain perspec
tive on ju t what we mean by the word. Dogmatism i a way of approaching
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information, a means of forming a belief and an attitude. An attitude differs from
a belief. An attitude is a judgment one has made, whereas a belief is information
one has. A belief may be factual or not, but it does not include a value judgment
about the item. An attitude is such a value judgment, a "general positive or
negative feeling toward something" (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981, p. 7). Values are
"concepts or beliefs ... about desirable end states or behaviors ... [that] transcend
specific situations ... [and] guide selection or evaluation of behaviors and events"
(Bilsky & Schwartz, 1994, p. 164). Values lay the foundation for the formation
of attitudes and beliefs by directing an individual's attention toward information
that serves a motivational need. Schwartz and colleagues (Bilsky & Schwartz,
1994; Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz, Sagiv, & Boehnke, 2000) describe these values
as existing on opposing continua situated along two dimensions: self-enhancen1ent versus self-transcendence and openness to change versus conservatism.
We can see an example of these value structures in Lakoff's (1996) analysis
of different political perspectives. He describes the opposing conservative and
liberal value orientations that are emblematic of differing points on Schwartz's
dimensions. Lakoff's Strict Father values strength above all else. This selfenhancement ideal is best served by conservative values. Being open to change
would permit challenges to one's power. The Nurturant Parent, who exists on
the opposite end of both dimensions , is self-transcendent and open to change.
These ideals are best served through empathy for others and an acceptance of
differing views. The value of strength that is the focus of the Strict Father has
been an important one in human history. Real dangers exist in nature and
among societies, particularly those that are fearful for their power or safety. The
Nurturant Parent, on the other hand, values strength, but only in the protection and nurturance of others. Both value orientations have had a prominent
history in a world of two genders.
Individuals with a conservative value orientation are likely to be more dogmatic than those open to change, because an evaluation of relevant information will present challenges to one's belief system. Conservatism-of any type
and not necessarily of a political sort-holds to its beliefs and is motivated by a
desire for predictability and security. A conservative may be evalu ating information very carefully as it relates to those motivations, however. In examining
information that would maintain a predictable and secure world, the conservative may make different assumptions than a liberal who looks at the same information as it relates to self-transcendence. These different assumptions were
arrived at with deliberation of facts through different lenses. A dogmatist would
not consider the facts.
Simply because a person cannot b e swayed to our point of view does not
make her or him dogmatic. Dogmatism is defined as "1) positiveness in assertion of opinion especially when unwarranted or arrogant[and] 2) a viewpoint
or system of ideas based on insufficiently examined premises" (Merriam-Webster
Online Dictionary, 2010). It is the notions of "unwarranted assertions" and
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"insufficiently examined premises" that we can explore through the psychological lens. If belief has been obtained through a careful consideration of evidence, dogmatism is not a valid criticism. Value orientations play an important
role in the development of belief, but differing values do not necessarily arise
from an insufficient evaluation of evidence.

Thinking Dispositions
Stanovich (2001) describes thinking dispositions as different from cogn1t1ve
ability. He cites Baron (1988) in n1aking the argun1ent that the emphasis on
ability in our conceptions of intelligence has distorted our perception of the
role dispositions play in individual ' thinking. Kuhn (personal communication,
April 3, 2010) suggests that the various thinking dispositions are affective, in
contrast to the actual processing of information, which is cognitive . Our processing of information is not limited by our abilities alone. We each have different "goals and epistemic values" (Stanovich, 2001, p. 247) that bring different
capacities to bear on any decision making in which we engage. Research on
cognition over the past several decades ha exposed ome of these dispositions.
They have received little attention in the research on gifted students, but are
highly applicable to a study of dogmatism among the highly able . What follows
is a description of a few of the most relevant of these dispositions.

Tolerance of Ambiguity Through her re earch in authoritarianism, FrenkelBrunswik (1949) identified an intolerance of anibiguity, a general personality
variable found to be associated with dogmatism. Budner (1962) expanded
on her work, describing intolerance of ambiguity as "a tendency to evaluate
particular phenomena in a particular way ... a tendency to manifest certain
modes of response irrespective of the phenomena being dealt with" (p. 31).
In other words, intolerance of ambiguity-"the tendency to perceive (i.e.,
interpret) ambiguous situations as sources of threat"-motivates certain
responses to stin1uli. Ambiguous situations lack the cues necessary to be
structured or categorized by the individual; they are novel, complex, or
insoluble. The intolerance of ambiguity scale developed by Budner is correlated
with authoritarianism, conventionalisn1, dogmatism about religious beliefs, and
other attitudes or characteristics consistent with an extreme belief system (e .g. ,
Jo st, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).
Regardless of ability level, some individuals will prefer more or less ambiguou situations because of the threat they feel from the difficulty in comprehending them. If an individual studiously avoids a situation or opposes a position
because of its ambiguity, any decisions made will have been achieved through
an insufficient examination of premises. We have found no indications from
empirical research that high-ability students have a greater tolerance of ambiguity than their less able peers.
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Closed-Mindedness Rokeach 's

(1960) conception of closed- and open-

mindedness is perhaps most closely aligned with a description of a dogmatic
or non-dogmatic thinker. The construct of closed-mindedness was developed
from his assertion that it is the structure of a belief system that leads one to
"accept or reject idea , people, and authority" (p. 8). In Rokeach's definition of
an open mind, information i evaluated and acted on without influence from
irrelevant internal (i .e. , habits , perceptual cues, power needs, etc.) or external
(i .e., authority figures, cultural norms, etc.) pre sures. A closed mind, on the
other hand, is less aware of the relevance of internal and external influence.
"The more closed the system, the more i the acceptance of a particular belief
a sumed to depend on irrelevant internal drives and/ or arbitrary reinforcements
from external authority" (p . 61). Individuals who score high on Rokeach's
Dogmatism Scale differ in their "ability to form new belief sy terns" (p. 397)
from those who core low. Rokeach believed that there are dual motivations
behind a closed or open mind: "the need for a cognitive framework to know
and to understand and the need to ward off threatening a pect of reality" (p.
67). He saw a closed mind as protection against anxiety. A do ed mind serve
as "a cognitive system .. . designed to shield a vulnerable mind" (p. 70). The
certainty of the do ed n1ind i protective again t the doubt presented by the
outside world.
In more recent re earch, Stanovich and West (1997) developed a measure of
actively open-minded thinking. This in trument indicate openness to belief
change and cognitive flexibility. Stanovich and West explore the construct in
their research on critical thinking; proposing, and ub equently finding , that
one cannot think critically without a willingness or ability to challenge his or
her prior beliefs.

Certainty Orientation According to Sorrentino and Short

all
individuals have a predisposition toward achieving certainty or avoiding it. An
uncertainty-oriented individual does not avoid information gathering, he or she
avoids reaching a definite or certain conclusion. The certainty-oriented person,
on the other hand, will not attempt to find more information if it will challenge
her present knowledge; " ... uncertainty-oriented people attend to ituations
that attain clarity, whereas certainty-oriented people attend to situations that
maintain clarity" (p. 391) . Such statements as " I know what I believe and
I believe what I believe is right" (G. W. Bush; Sanger, 2001, in Jo t et al.,
2003, p. 353) can be interpreted as representing a certainty orientation. This
orientation will affect both one' right-left belie£ and their ideological rigidity.
The certainty-oriented person is likely to choo e the opinion that provide the
mo t certainty. Sorrentino and Short describe the certainty-oriented person
thi way:
(1986),

Self-assessment, ocial (and physical) comparison, di onance reduction,
cau al searches and attributions, po sible selves, self-concept di crepancy
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reduction, self-confrontation, social justice, and equity are all characteristics that this person does not have or is not susceptible to. This person is
likely to be prejudiced, bigoted, opinionated, and a sexist.
(p. 400)
The opposite-open-minded, tolerant of differences, flexible-is rn.uch
more ambiguous and challenging to process intellectually. The uncertaintyoriented person is identified by these characteristics. Through their openn1indedness and acceptance of a1nbiguity, a more complex understanding of
the world is possible.
Need for Cognitive Closure In his theory of lay epistemics, Kruglanski (1989)
proposes that there are individual differences in the Need for Cognitive Closure,
the need to achieve an answer-any answer-to avoid confusion or ambiguity.
Situations vary as well, and some situations are more favorable when closure is
avoided, as in making an important decision that will mean sacrifice or hard hip.
Although need for closure can be affected by such situational differences as
time pressure, ambient noise, or attractiveness of the task, there is a general
tendency for individuals to attempt to achieve closure with similar patterns that
vary individually (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). It is difficult to maintain an
open mind when one seeks closure rapidly. This construct is an elaboration
of Rokeach 's (1960) closed-mindedness and includes aspects of Sorrentino and
Short's (1986) certainty orientation. There are times when one n1ust achieve
closure quickly, as in situations of time pressure or danger. When this is not the
case, however, a high need for cognitive closure will re ult in dogmatism.
Need for Cognition Cacioppo and Petty (1982) found that people vary in
their enjoy1nent of thinking; their need for cognition. Whereas subjects with
a high need for cognition found a sin1ple task unpleasant and a complex task
pleasant, subjects with a low need for cognition reported the reverse. Need
for cognition correlated negatively with dogmatism (r = -.27, N = 104, p <
.05), indicating that an open mind is one with a preference for activity. An
individual high in the need for cognition would tend to be the opposite of the
certainty-oriented individual, with a desire to search for more information,
even when it challenges his or her pre ent beliefs.
We would hope that the intellectually gifted child has this preference for
cognition, particularly if that preference has been nurtured from an early age.
Need for cognition has been found to correlate with measures of fluid intelligence in an older sample (Stuart-Hamilton & McDonald, 2001). In a review
of the literature on need for cognition, Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, Blair, and
J arvis (1996) reported that a relationship between such factors a verbal ability
and school achieven1ent covary with need for cognition, but there is no evidence that abstract reasoning shares this relationship. Different types of intellectual ability may be associated with different thinking dispositions.
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There is a parallel in the gifted literature to the need for cognition. Dabrowski's (1966) Theory of Positive Disintegration is often proposed as providing
the architecture for advanced development. The theory emphasizes intensity,
sensitivity, and overexcitability as characteristic of the highly gifted. It is based
on the premise that advanced development is possible as people strive toward
what ought to be rather than focusing on what is. Overexcitabilities are inborn
tendencies to respond to environment stimuli. For example, intellectual overexcitabilities are often considered characteristic of the gifted personality and
described as a need to seek understanding, the truth, and to analyze and synthesize information (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977). However, Dabrowski's
theory claims that one of the types of the five overexcitabilities (sensorimotor,
sensual, imaginational, intellectual, emotional) would often exist in the highly
gifted personality, not necessarily that intellectual overexcitabilities would
exist. Some have argued that all five categories of overexcitabilities would exist
in the highly gifted. The research on this theory, while growing, is quite limited and mixed, but it does provide a link between the field of gifted studies
and cognitive psychology.

Personal Epistemology
The cognitive orientations described have been studied largely separately from
research in personal epistemology. Thi~ field has not yet produced a clearly
articulated model explaining a person's beliefs about knowledge and knowing
(Greene, Torney-Purta, & Azevedo, 2010; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997), although
interest in personal epistemology research has been steady. One branch of
investigation in this area has generated a description of the development of
epistemological understanding that may be useful to us in our examination of
motivated dogmatism.
Perry (1970) and Kitchener and King (1990), in their early work on personal
epistemology, found that college students developed their knowledge about
knowing in stages, from a view of knowledge as absolute and handed down
from an authority, to uncertainty, and then a more mature position of the
subjectivity of knowledge. Schommer (1994) describes beliefs about knowledge and knowing as centered on "the source, certainty, and organization of
knowledge, as well as the speed and control of knowledge acquisition" (p. 302).
These beliefs are significantly related to myriad aspects of learning. For example, learners who believe that knowledge is fed to a passive recipient from an
authority are less engaged in the learning process (Schommer, 1994). Students
who believed that learning should be quick were less persistent in a difficult
learning task than those who believed learning is a gradual process. Dweck
and Leggett (1988) found that beliefs about ability, intelligence in particular, as
either a fixed entity or as incremental and, thus, improvable, affect motivation
to achieve. Epistemological beliefs have implications for adequate processing of
information in decision making.
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In her study of informal reasoning, Kuhn (1991) interviewed 160 subjects
of varying ages, genders, and education levels about their beliefs concerning
three topics: a student struggling in school, a criminal repeatedly ending up in
prison, and unemployment. Subjects were asked to give their opinions concerning the scenario described and then queried about why they believe so, how
they might be convinced otherwise, and how they might convince someone
with a divergent opinion that they were right. Even with very little information to go on, more than half of the subjects believed very strongly they knew
the cause of the problem. Some of these subjects admitted they did not have
n1uch knowledge of the topic , but maintained their level of certainty regardless. These subjects fell into the absolutist category and held very strongly to the
opinion that they could not be swayed from that belief, even w hen they agreed
another person might be right: " ... personal commitment to [their] theory is
sufficient to ensure its certainty" (p. 175). The large numbers of absolutists in
Kuhn's study would be considered dogmatic. They hold unwarranted beliefs
acquired through an insufficient examination of evidence.
About a third of Kuhn's subjects fell into the multiplist epistemological category. These subjects believed strongly that anyone's opinion could be right.
The n1ultiplist may be just a right as an expert or more so, particularly when
his or her belief is based on p ersonal experience, as in the school scenario . The
multiplists base their beliefs on an "ownership" of the opinion. The multiplist
has insufficiently examined the evidence persons with opposing views have
used to reach a decision and has seized on her or his own opinion. Dogmatic
in their own views, multiplists may not be perceived as such because of their
willingness to accept differing viewpoints. The end result, however, is a belief
achieved with insufficient evidence.
The remaining 20% of the subjects in Kuhn's (1991) study were categorized
as evaluative epistemologists. This minority believed that n1ultiple viewpoints may
exist and that they can be compared to each other and evaluated to determine
how valid or accurate they might be. These subjects did not maintain a high
level of certainty in their beliefs and felt that they could be swayed by the arguments of others, especially experts, if sufficient evidence wa provided.
Following up on this classification of thinkers , Kuhn (2003) has utilized the
research on personal epistemology (see Hofer & Pintrich, 1997, for a review) to
describe these categories as developmental, adding a preschool age of realist, in
which children consider what they know to be just what they see. Table 10.1
describes these levels of epistemological understanding.
To an evaluative epistemologist, it is clear that the development of an evaluative orientation should be the objective of any schooling. A nation made up of
multiplists and absolutists will be easily manipulated or, at best, poor decision
makers. At this time, we know little about the developmental progression of
personal epistemology. Most research on its development has been with college
samples (Kitchener, King, Wood, & Davison, 1989; Schommer, 1994). From
what we do know about gifted children, it is likely that many of them could
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TABLE 10.1 Levels of Epistemological Understanding

Level

Assertions

Knowledge

Critical Thinking

Realist

Assertions are COPIES
of an external reality.

Knowledge comes
from an external
source and is certain.

Critical thinking is
unnecessary.

Absolutist

Assertions are FACTS
that are correct or
incorrect in their
representation of
reality.

Knowledge comes
from an external
source and is certain
but not directly
accessible, producing
false beliefs.

Critical thinking is a
vehicle for
comparing
assertions to reality
and determining
their truth or
falsehood.

Multiplist

Assertions are
OPINIONS freely
chosen by and
accountable only to
their owners.

Knowledge is
generated by human
minds and therefore
uncertain.

Critical thinking is
irrelevant.

Evaluativist

Assertions are
JUDGMENTS that can
be evaluated and
compared according to
criteria of argument
and evidence.

Knowledge is
generated by human
minds and is
uncertain but
susceptible to
evaluation.

Critical thinking is
valued as a vehicle
that promotes sound
assertions and
enhances
understanding.

Reprinted with permission from Kuhn , D. (2003 ). Understanding and valuing knowing as developmental goals.
Liberal Education, 89(3), 16-21.

attain higher levels of epistemological development at an early age. Could we
expect a gifted absolutist? Multiplist? Almost certainly.

Thinking Dispositions and High Ability
Values, attitudes, cognitive orientations, personal epistemologies-the highly
able student possesses all of these. Despite their exceptional cognitive ability, a
thinking disposition that does not include an open rn.ind is limiting. A number
of researchers have found that cognitive ability does not predict the ability
to reason carefully. Klaczynski (1997) found that high intellectual ability did
not protect adolescents from biased reasoning. Subjects preferred to look for
information consistent with their own prior beliefs regardless of their intellectual ability. These findings have been repeatedly corroborated (Klaczynski &
Gordon, 1996; Klaczynski et al., 1997): cognitive ability does not equate with
reasoning ability or the use of heuristics in evaluating information. The gifted
child may well be an absolutist. Even a high need for cognition was not sufficient to predict unbiased critical reasoning (Klaczynski et al., 1997). Stanovich
and West (1997) found that the ability to evaluate an argument independently
of prior belief was more reliant on one's open-mindedness than on one's cognitive ability.
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Although all these studies of critical thinking (Klaczynski, 1997; Klaczynski
et al., 1997; Stanovich & West, 1997) found ways in which ability was associated with the quality of reasoning, biases and thinking dispositions were unrelated to cognitive ability. In contrast to these results, Sa, West, and Stanovich
(1999) did find a relationship between cognitive ability and the ability to ignore
prior knowledge and belief when engaging in a reasoning task. The difference
in this study and others is that Sa and colleagues explicitly told their subjects to
ignore their prior knowledge or belief. When given these instructions, those
with greater cognitive ability were better able to engage in thoughtful reasoning than their less-able peers. This is a very positive finding for those who wish
to encourage more open-mindedness among high-ability tudents. They can
be open-n1inded if they are taught to be.

Developing Evaluative Epistemologists Among the Highly Able
A study of the highly able, by whatever definition is chosen, is a study of individual differences. The sample is selected based on their fit with the selected
criteria. The constructs described here are all imilarly designed to find individual differences in ways of thinking-those who are more or less tolerant of
ambiguity, closed-minded, certainty-oriented, and so forth. From the critical
thinking research cited (Klaczynski, 1997; Klaczynski et al., 1997; Stanovich &
West, 1997), it is evident that these variations in cognitive ability and di positions exist in many combinations. The motivation to be open-minded may be
weak when one has been encouraged through influence or experience to prefer
predictability and heuristics for reasoning. How can educators encourage the
opposite? Are there ways of nurturing an open mind?
We propose that it is possible to encourage open-mindedness among the
highly able . Dogmatism is, again, defined as "1) positiveness in assertion of
opinion ... [and] 2) a viewpoint or system of ideas based on insufficiently examined premises" (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2010). First and foremost,
educators must teach their students how to sufficiently examine any premise.
With these skills, it will be difficult for students to be positive in their assertions
until they have fully explored the problem.
Those of us in higher education have come to know that the more we learn,
the more there is to learn. Our own open-mindedness has developed through
learning how to pose a research question and examine it systematically. Science
and mathematics education focus on these methods, but all subjects should
emphasize the methods needed for sufficiently exploring a premise. Halpern
(1998) proposes the following critical-thinking skills as necessary for developing effective thinkers: (a) verbal reasoning skills, (b) argument analysis skills,
(c) skills in thinking as hypothesis testing, (d) likelihood and uncertainty, and
(e) decision-making and problem-solving skills . These skills should be foundational in learning about any content area.
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Many of the motivating epistemic orientations described here have been
proposed as protective: Budner's (1962) intolerance of ambiguity protects
against the threat of complex situations; Rokeach's (1960) closed-mindedness
protects one from the confusion of the outside world; Sorrentino and Short's
(1986) certainty orientation protects the clarity one has achieved in a situation.
These protections will not be necessary once a student has successfully learned
how to analyze a situation. Developing critical thinking skills (Klaczynski,
1997; Klaczynski & Gordon, 1996) and learning how to evaluate an argument
(Kuhn & Dean, 2005; Kuhn & Udell, 2003) will provide protection from the
anxiety produced by complex situations; students will know how to deconstruct and analyze them.
Learning about one's own "personal theories" of knowledge (Hofer &
Pintrich, 1997) is useful for challenging immature epistemological beliefs. For
example, the notion of an "omniscient authority" (Schommer, 1990, 1994)
and that hands down information must be dispelled if we wish to encourage
a complete examination of a premise. The current focus on accountability in
education fosters such immature beliefs in students, who must learn "the facts"
to be successful on high-stakes tests. Educators and students alike can benefit
from an understanding of their own beliefs about knowledge.
Parents and past experience will have played a substantial role in the development of open-mindedness before a student arrives in the classroom. Some
students will arrive with a great willingness to explore, while others will be
more inhibited, held back by fears of rejection or embarrassment. Educators
should consider their students' values of self-enhancement or transcendence
and openness to change or conservatism. Forcing a child who values conservatism to step outside the boundaries of tradition and conformity is likely to
result in discomfort unless done with sensitivity. Educators should provide a
supportive classroom, one where questioning is valued over answers, where
exploration is encouraged and reyvarded, where the "facts" take a b ack seat to
the methods used to obtain them.
To be most effective in promoting open-mindedness, educators must provide a role model to their students. Modeling a high need for cognition, a
tolerance for ambiguity, an uncertainty orientation, a low need for cognitive closure (except when appropriate), and an open mind will go a long way
towards reducing dogmatism in their students.
Our goal as educators should be to produce evaluative epistemologists. One
must be open-minded to carefully evaluate information, as Stanovich and
West's (1997) research demonstrated. This open-mindedness should extend to
the dogmatic you encounter. Are you sufficiently examining the evidence of
their argument? Or are you relying on your own beliefs to reach that conclusion? Close examination of values may identify the source of differences of
opinion. It is important to remember that dogmatism is a way of approaching
information. The content of a b elief system is not the source of dogn1atism ,
regardless of how much one disagrees.
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Although dogmatism has been measured as a stable trait (Rokeach, 1960),
there is evidence that dogrn.atic behaviors are, instead, affected by situations
(Kruglanski, 1989) and are motivated (e.g., Cacioppo et al., 19_96; Jost et al,
2003) by the satisfaction of basic needs, including safety and cognitive needs
(Maslow, 1970), and by individual values. An analysis of the thinking dispositions and personal epistemology literature suggests a path for educators who
wish to encourage the developn1ent of evaluative epistemology. Providing
them with the tools of evaluation will be the greatest protection educators can
give the high-ability student. They require more than a hammer to deal with
the complex world around us.
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